





BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS 
A Journal of Vytautas Magnus University 











RETHINKING THE IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFORMATIVE 
ECONOMIC INNOVATIONS: 





Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Law (Lithuania) 
Contact information 
Address: Jonavos str. 66, Kaunas, LT-44191, Lithuania 
Phone: +370 37 203775 
E-mail address: julija.kirsiene@vdu.lt 
 
Christopher Kelley 
Associate Professor; Dr. 
University of Arkansas, School of Law (United States) 
Contact information 
Address: Fayetteville, AR 72701, United States 
Phone: +479 575 3230 




Mykolas Romeris University, School of Law (Lithuania) 
Contact information 
Address: Ateities st. 20, LT-08303 Vilnius, Lithuania 
Phone: +370 5 271 4578 
E-mail address: deividas@kirsys.lt 
 
 
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 




LL.M. in Law 
Vytautas Magnus University, Faculty of Law (Lithuania) 
Contact information 
Address: Jonavos str. 66, Kaunas, LT-44191, Lithuania 
Phone: + 370 37 203775 
E-mail address: juraszymancius@gmail.com 
 
 
Received: April 30, 2019; reviews: 2; accepted: December 20, 2019. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article participates in mapping existing legal implications stemming from 
contemporary innovation. The article relies on a case analysis of artificial intelligence, drones 
and blockchain, to reflect a majority of the underlying legal issues to which many emerging 
innovations might contribute, and it attempts to map them into different categories of 
challenges – liability, privacy, and property. It concludes by pinpointing three main reasons 
behind the identified legal implications: the growing “consciousness” and autonomy of 
emerging technologies, the growing availability of transformative innovations to the broad 
public and the development of participatory models in economy and other social spheres, 
including law, and the tendency for transformative innovations to function in regulatory 
uncertainty. As a means to cope with challenges generated by technological progress, the 
article leans towards a process-focused approach that promotes embedding values in the 
early stages of technological development. 
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The world is shifting from the age of digital electronics, which can be 
described as the third industrial revolution, to the fourth industrial revolution, which 
is characterized by a fusion of technologies. 1  Klaus Schwab believes that it is 
changing not only how we live but also who we are and that it is evolving on a scale 
and at a pace that was never before witnessed in the history of humankind.2  
Because technology tends to develop faster that legal regulation, it is easy to 
forget that innovations are meant to aid human progress in various dimensions, not 
only mere economic growth. Therefore, a human-centred approach to legal 
regulation of technological development is required. The present paper aims to 
identify early warning signs of change in the economic environment and to provide 
a research basis for legal regulation issues stemming from this change. 
The paper relies on a case analysis of three emerging innovations that are 
very different in terms of application, economic and social impact, pace of evolving, 
yet are also interconnected and indeed share homogeneity of challenges for private 
law: artificial intelligence, drones, and blockchain. 3  Each case analysis will 
distinguish the main legal implications that the innovation under consideration 
raises. Then, the identified implications will be generalized and assigned to different 
areas of law, outlining the main concerns towards which policy makers should be 
shifting their attention when drafting regulation. The paper will conclude by offering 
a value-based approach to legal regulation. 
The scope of this work is civilian contexts and excludes any scenarios related 
to war. Therefore, some examples of issues that are out-of-scope include the ethics 
of using transformative innovations in war, politics and practices of smart weapons, 
increased ability of warfare without harm to the human resources of the party that 
started the war. Any analysis of existing doctrine, legislation and institutional 
guidelines is limited to the European Union and the United States of America. 
This article consists of three main segments. The first part takes a short 
glimpse at the implications inherent in artificial intelligence, drones, and blockchain. 
The second part expands the implications case-by-case. Finally, the last part 
 
1 Chris Holder, et al., “Robotics and Law: Key Legal and Regulatory Implications of the Robotics Age 
(Part I of II),” Computer Law & Security Review Vol. 32, No. 3 (June 2016): 383 // 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2016.03.001. 
2 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution, 1st U.S. edition (New York: Crown Business, 2017), 1. 
3 Although there are many other technological innovations that have emerged over the recent years, we 
feel that the examples of artificial intelligence, drones and blockchain technologies are able to reflect 
many of the underlying implications that transformative innovations have brought about to private law 
and that conducting similar case analysis of other emerging innovations such as robots, the internet of 
things, sharing economy and so on, would most likely indicate the same or at least strongly related 
trends. 
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attempts to generalize and map the emerging challenges of transformative 
innovations and suggests guidelines for regulatory responses considering the layer 
of values. 
1. IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFORMATIVE INNOVATIONS IN ECONOMY 
Although it is argued that “society and technology develop in tandem,”4 it is 
also obvious that technologies such as internet, artificial intelligence, robots, 
blockchain, autonomous cars, drones, gene editing and the like, which are blurring 
the lines between human and technological capabilities5, can change the world 
profoundly and irrevocably. 
Transformative innovations are not just tools,6 objects of the material world 
or neutral mediators used to realize human potential, goals, relationships or 
identity.7 They influence all layers of society’s life – economic, political, and social. 
On one hand, innovation can be expected to expand opportunities for people, help 
us live more fulfilling, healthier lives, as well as solve many global challenges. On 
the other hand, the voices of concern on complex issues of fundamental rights, 
ethics, equality of opportunities, access to resources, a greater sense of wellbeing 
in global context as well as existential risks are increasing in volume.8 This moment 
in history is often addressed as “critical”, “revolutionary”, “chaotic”, because 
technocratic transformation seems inevitable and out of human control.9 
At the heart of transformative innovations is artificial intelligence (AI). In an 
open letter, which was already signed by more than 8000 scholars, leaders and 
experts, the Future of Life institute acknowledged that AI has already overstepped 
the threshold of being merely a laboratory research to an economically valuable 
technology. With the consensus that AI is progressing steadily, the letter argues 
that the impact on society is likely to increase prompting greater investments in 
research of the field. The letter calls for expanded research to reap the benefits of 
 
4 World Economic Forum, “Values, Ethics and Innovation: Rethinking Technological Development in the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution” // https://www.weforum.org/whitepapers/values-ethics-and-innovation-
rethinking-technological-development-in-the-fourth-industrial-revolution/. 
5 David C. Vladeck, “Machines without principals: liability rules and artificial intelligence,” Washington 
Law Review Vol. 89, No. 1 (2014): 2. 
6 Ibid.: 120. 
7 Mireille Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the End(s) of Law: Novel Entanglements of Law and 
Technology (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015); Rathenau Instituut, “Human rights in the robot age: 
Challenges arising from the use of robotics, artificial intelligence and virtual and augmented reality” // 
https://www.rathenau.nl/en/digital-society/human-rights-robot-age. 
8  Future of Life Institute, “An Open Letter: Research priorities for robust and beneficial artificial 
intelligence” // https://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter/. 
9  Alexander Bard and Jan Söderqvist, Syntheism: Creating God in the Internet Age (Stockholm: 
Stockholm text, 2014); World Economic Forum, supra note 4. 
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AI while avoiding potential pitfalls.10 McKinsey global institute predicts that AI could 
potentially deliver additional global economic activity of around $13 trillion by 2030, 
which would amount to about 16 percent higher cumulative GDP compared with 
today. 11  From autonomous vehicles to self-learning personal assistants, the 
application scenarios are overwhelmingly vast, but so are the possible ethical, 
societal, and legal implications. AI gives rise to questions about how to ensure 
safety and security of interconnected autonomous devices, about who is responsible 
for damages caused by an autonomous device, about how laws and institutions 
should be redesigned to deal with this technology, and about which values 
autonomous systems should serve.12 
Another great example of highly influential innovations is the drone. The 
military counterparts of drones have been used for almost a century,13 whereas 
smaller, consumer drones have only emerged recently as their components became 
cost-effective to mass-produce. Consulting group PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
estimates that drone powered solutions will replace 127 billion dollars’ worth of 
global business and labour in by the year 2020.14 New ways to apply drones to our 
everyday lives seem to appear daily. In the commercial sector drones are already 
used to take “jaw dropping” pictures from above by photographers and 
journalists,15 to create 3D maps for construction,16 to spray crops and monitor 
livestock in agriculture,17 and to deliver goods to stranded locations.18 Consumers 
are using drones for racing,19 and capturing travel videos or simply as toys for 
 
10 Future of Life Institute, supra note 8; Stuart Russell, Daniel Dewey, and Max Tegmark, “Research 
Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence,” Ai Magazine Vol. 36, No. 4 (2015). 
11 Michael Chui, et al., “Sizing the Potential Value of AI and Advanced Analytics,” McKinsey and Company 
(April, 2018) // https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/artificial-intelligence/notes-from-the-ai-
frontier-applications-and-value-of-deep-learning. 
12 European Commission, European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, “Statement on 
Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems,” B-1049, Brussels (2018) // 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/ege_ai_statement_2018.pdf. 
13 Katharine Hall Kindervater, “The Emergence of Lethal Surveillance: Watching and Killing in the History 
of Drone Technology,” Security Dialogue Vol. 47, No. 3 (2016) // 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010615616011. 
14 Patrick Cairns, “World Drone Market Seen Nearing $127bn in 2020, PwC Says,” Moneyweb (May 9, 
2016) // https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/tech/world-drone-market-seen-nearing-127bn-2020-pwc-
says; “Clarity from above. PwC global report on the commercial applications of drone technology,” 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (May 2016) // https://www.pwc.pl/pl/pdf/clarity-from-above-pwc.pdf. 
15 Will Coldwell, “High Times: Why Drone Photography Offers a Different View of Travel,” The Guardian 
(June 17, 2016) // http://www.theguardian.com/travel/2016/jun/17/why-drone-photography-offers-a-
different-view-of-travel. 
16 “DroneDeploy is a company that builds cloud-based software for drone mapping, making it possible to 
create aerial maps and 3D models with a single click. DroneDeploy’s software automates drone flight and 
makes it easy to capture aerial data with a mobile app”; more at: Amit Chowdhry, “The Story Behind 
DroneDeploy And How It Built The Largest Drone Mapping Repository,” Forbes (July 16, 2017) // 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2017/10/16/dronedeploy/. 
17 Caspar van Vark, “How Drones Can Detect Crop Problems Early to Keep Farmers on Track,” The 
Guardian (December 26, 2015) //  
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/dec/26/drones-farming-crop-problems-uavs. 
18 Sara Salinas, “Biggest Delivery Breakthrough since Amazon Prime,” CNBC (May 22, 2018) // 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/biggest-delivery-breakthrough-since-amazon-prime.html. 
19 Ian Frazier, “The Trippy, High-Speed World of Drone Racing,” The New Yorker (January 29, 2018) // 
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children. Governments are known to use drones for military purposes, search and 
rescue operations or crime prevention. As drone technology is further developed, 
they may be used as modes of transportation, 20  antennas to extend cellular 
networks21 or as super weapons.22 However, together with potential benefits also 
come implications. Photo-capable flying robots may have negative effects on 
multiple dimensions of individual privacy, high congestion in the low altitude 
airspace may lead to problems with airspace ownership, extending drone autonomy 
with high-tech sensors and advanced artificial intelligence software may lead to 
security and liability issues.  
The third ground-breaking technology analysed in this paper is blockchain. 
The popularity and applicability of distributed ledger technologies, broadly referred 
to as blockchains, has risen significantly in the past few years.23 Even though at 
present the most famous way to use this technology is for decentralized 
cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin or Ethereum, it has various other applications that 
have the potential to redesign digital business altogether. For example, it can be 
used for smart contracts, real-estate title transfers, protection of intellectual 
property, supply chain auditing, identity management, governance (elections, poll 
taking, electronic government), direct interaction between parties in sharing 
economy, crowdfunding and venture capital funds, and stock trading.24 However, 
blockchain technology also comes with a set of legal issues. Since blockchain-based 
transactions are difficult to trace, it can cause liability governance issues. The 
immutability of distributed ledger technologies poses dangers to privacy, data 
protection and consumer protection. Other key implications include the legal 
enforceability of smart contracts, and the legal status of Decentralized Autonomous 
Organizations (DAOs) as entities. 25 
Transformative innovations may lead our lives to “chaos”, if we fail to find 
adequate measures to frame them.26 One of these measures is legal regulation.  
 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/05/the-trippy-high-speed-world-of-drone-racing. 
20 Jane Wakefield, “Dubai Tests Drone Taxi Service,” BBC News (September 26, 2017) // 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-41399406. 
21 Ludovico Ferranti, et al., “Drone Cellular Networks: Enhancing the Quality Of Experience of Video 
Streaming Applications,” Ad Hoc Networks 78 (2018) // https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adhoc.2018.05.003. 
22 Alexis C. Madrigal, “Drone Swarms Are Going to Be Terrifying and Hard to Stop,” The Atlantic (March 
7, 2018) // https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/drone-swarms-are-going-to-be-
terrifying/555005/. 
23 “Size of the blockchain technology market worldwide from 2018 to 2023 (in billion U.S. dollars)” 
Statista // https://www.statista.com/statistics/647231/worldwide-blockchain-technology-market-size/. 
24 The Law Society, “Blockchain: The legal implications of distributed systems” (August 1, 2017) // 
https://www.lawsociety.org.uk/support-services/research-trends/horizon-scanning/blockchain/. 
25 Philip Boucher, et al., How Blockchain Technology Could Change Our Lives: In-Depth Analysis (2017), 
22 // http://bookshop.europa.eu/uri?target=EUB:NOTICE:QA0217043:EN:HTML; The Law Society, supra 
note 24. 
26 Rathenau Instituut, supra note 7; Patrick Lin, Keith Abney, and George A. Bekey, eds., Robot Ethics: 
The Ethical and Social Implications of Robotics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2012), 183. 
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2. IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSFORMATIVE ECONOMIC INNOVATIONS: 
CASE ANALYSIS 
2.1. CASE ANALYSIS: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE27 
Transformative innovations are increasingly based on artificial intelligence (AI) 
technology, with human-like skills such as learning, speech recognition, automated 
reasoning, sensing, interaction, problem solving or creativity28. One of the first 
technologies to put legal regulation to the test is autonomous vehicles. In many 
aspects autonomous vehicles are better at performing precarious activities that are 
currently performed by man (such as driving), because machines never fall asleep, 
they never drive drunk, get distracted by a text message or conversation, they 
never drink coffee or eat, they do not get angry or drowsy. Bearing in mind these 
human deficiencies, it would be no surprise if the massive introduction of 
autonomous vehicles considerably lessened the rate of accidents. 29  In a world 
where driverless cars or drones will have the capacity to „sense-think-act„ at their 
own will and plan30, the legal system will, first of all, have to address the liability 
issues31 of autonomously32 thinking machines.  
In this regard, a distinction between deterministic and cognitive devices is 
important. Both deterministic and cognitive devices perform their tasks through 
algorithms;33 however, the difference between the two types is that the first do not 
have the ability to learn and are predictable, whereas the latter have learning 
capabilities which make their behaviour stochastic (random).34 AI technology uses 
cognitive algorithms which are not merely programmed to perform specific tasks, 
but also to learn and further develop themselves in interaction with their 
environment. Given the complexity of the design, construction and programming of 
 
27 Artificial intelligence is defined as “a discipline concerned with the building of computer programs, that 
perform tasks requiring intelligence when done by human”, for example, Andrew Butterfield and Gerard 
Ekembe Ngondi, eds., A Dictionary of Computer Science, 7th edition (Oxford University Press, 2016), 26. 
28 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, “Robotics Ethics”: 4 // 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/comest/robotics-ethics/. 
29 David C. Vladeck, supra note 5: 126. 
30 Ibid.: 122. 
31 Lawrence B. Solum, “Legal personhood for artificial intelligences,” NCL Review Vol. 70: 1231; Civil 
Law Rules on Robotics: European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2017 with Recommendations to 
the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics (2015/2103(INL)), European Union: European 
Parliament, 2017. 
32 Autonomy is defined as “the capacity to operate in the real-world environment without any form of 
external control, once the machine is activated and at least in some areas of operation, for extended 
periods of time” (George A. Bekey, “Current trends in robotics: technology and ethics”; in: Robot ethics: 
the ethical and social implications of robotics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2012); Patrick Lin, Keith 
Abney, and George A. Bekey, supra note 26, 18; Civil Law Rules on Robotics, supra note 31. 
33 An algorithm is defined as “a prescribed set of well-defined rules or instructions for the solution of a 
problem, such as the performance of a calculation, in a finite number of steps” (Andrew Butterfield and 
Gerard Ekembe Ngondi, supra note 27, 16). 
34 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supra note 28: 4, 7. 
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AI devices, a central legal issue will be the possibility to track the reasons of all 
past actions (and omissions). 35  This is ethically and legally crucial because “a 
robot’s decision paths must be re-constructible for the purposes of litigation and 
dispute resolution.”36 
Notions of clarity, traceability and transparency that are usually associated 
with traditional views of mathematics and technology will only work well with 
deterministic algorithms, whereas cognitive algorithms will be far from clear and 
might be difficult to trace. This would lead to epistemically opaque37 machines the 
decisions of which would not only be unpredictable, but also hard to trace. 
Moreover, cognitive technologies also have the ability to learn from past human 
experiences and calibrate their algorithms themselves. It means they will also learn 
from materials that are indeed full of typical human moral imperfections, such as 
partiality, selfishness, emotional bias or prejudice, weakness of will and so on. 
Hence, there is obvious tension between the ‘traceability’ requirement (considering 
the problem of epistemic opacity) and the development of robots with a high level 
of autonomy in decision-making and advanced learning capabilities. On the other 
hand, this legal limitation is unlikely to have a significant impact on the further 
development of cognitive devices, since their ability to outperform humans in 
various tasks will most likely outweigh their detriments. 
Where human involvement in decision-making of AI is obvious, there is no 
need to re-examine legal regulation.38 The companies that currently manufacture 
devices with AI are already subject to a well-developed doctrine of product 
liability.39 So, all harms potentially caused by AI technologies are treated the same 
way as with any other technological product (e.g. toys, cars or weapons).  As a 
matter of fact, most accidents occur due to inevitable errors in design, 
programming and production of such machines. Because of this, possible failures 
are usually categorized into design defects, manufacturing defects, information 
defects and failures to instruct.40  
 
35  David C. Vladeck, supra note 5: 141–43; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, supra note 28: 6-7. 
36  Laurel Riek and Don Howard, “A code of ethics for the human-robot interaction profession,” 
Proceedings of We Robot (2014): 6. 
37 Epistemically opaque machines are said to represent a black box, the internal functioning of which 
cannot be fully elucidated, whose decisions are unpredictable and untraceable (Julian Newman, 
“Epistemic Opacity, Confirmation Holism and Technical Debt: Computer Simulation in the Light of 
Empirical Software Engineering”; in: Fabio Gadducci and Mirko Tavosanis, eds., History and Philosophy 
of Computing, Vol. 487 (Springer International Publishing, 2016) // https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-
47286-7_18. 
38 David C. Vladeck, supra note 5: 120. 
39 Peter M. Asaro, “A Body to Kick, but Still No Soul to Damn: Legal Perspectives on Robotics”: 169; in: 
Robot ethics: The ethical and social implications of robotics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2012). 
40 David C. Vladeck, supra note 5: 127–141; Civil Law Rules on Robotics, supra note 31. 
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However, researchers argue that the already existent product liability legal 
framework is likely to become inadequate as commercially available AI machines 
become more sophisticated and autonomous, eventually blurring the lines between 
responsibilities of manufacturers and responsibilities of users.41 For example, if a 
manufacturer offered different versions of AI algorithms, and a buyer knowingly 
chose one of them, is the buyer to blame for the harmful consequences of the 
algorithm’s decisions? In this regard, it would be difficult to hold the manufacturer 
responsible for any creative, even if dangerous, uses of their products. Cars and 
weapons are also very dangerous consumer products, but users still tend to be 
liable for most of the harms they have caused, because the use of those potentially 
dangerous products place an additional burden of responsibility on the user. 42 
Hence, the increasing autonomy of smart devices poses an additional question: who 
exactly should bear ethical and/or legal responsibility for the behaviour of cognitive 
(with learning abilities) machines. Currently, there typically seems to be a ‘shared’ 
or ‘distributed’ responsibility between robot designers, engineers, programmers, 
manufacturers, investors, sellers and users, because none of these agents can be 
indicated as the ultimate source of action.43 Scholars argue that this solution tends 
to dilute the notion of responsibility altogether: if everybody has a part in the total 
responsibility, no one is fully responsible.44  On the other hand, most European 
jurisdictions already have rules providing that damage caused by the concurrent 
actions of several tortfeasors as a consequence generally result in collective 
liability. A tortfeasor can also be liable individually for the whole damage through 
the concept of “joint and several” liability or solidary liability. This concept prevents 
actors that have contributed to the damage from avoiding liability and complex 
accidents from fractioning, in this sense, offering better protection for the victim.45  
Further analysing AI liability, another important question is related to 
standard of care. Normally, the professional standard of care is higher when a 
certain activity is dangerous. Danger is often measured by the probability of 
occurrence and the gravity of harm, which, in other words, means that the greater 
the danger, the higher degree of care. Danger is also usually the source of strict 
liability regulatory regime in many legal systems or at least more strict liability 
based for example on the reversal of the normally set burden of proof. On the other 
hand, should we, in terms of product liability rules, apply a lower standard of care 
 
41 Peter M. Asaro, supra note 39:174; Civil Law Rules on Robotics, supra note 31. 
42 Peter M. Asaro, supra note 39: 170–74. 
43 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, supra note 28: 4.42. 
44 Ibid: 4.  
45  Bénédict Winiger, Håkan Andersson, and Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, eds., 
“Essential Cases on Natural Causation”: 344-352; in: Digest of European Tort Law, Vol. 1 (Springer 
International Publishing, 2007). 
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 
VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2  2019 
 
 56 
for autonomously thinking machines just because we expect them to be so 
technologically advanced that they should fail much less than humans?46 If we 
move towards this approach, modern devices would be expected to be much more 
effective in discovering danger before it manifests than humans. In an unexpected 
event, for example, a child darting in front of a moving vehicle, a tree limb 
unexpectedly crashing down on the road ahead, or other traffic participants 
breaking traffic laws and creating pre-accidental driving situations, cognitive 
machines would be expected to react at speeds humans cannot match.47 
In this context, one more issue discussed by scholars is: why should we apply 
a strict liability regime in AI cases if cognitive devices are likely to be less 
dangerous than the products they replace? Strict liability rules are an exemption to 
the fault-based liability regime. They are based on risk theory, i.e. the notion that 
the activity or device being used is dangerous. Some scholars argue that applying 
this theory on cognitive devices might be problematic because they are likely to be 
far less hazardous or risky than the products they replace.48 However, others argue 
that there are strong policy reasons to establish an insurance based49 strict liability 
regime for cases related to intelligent devices. One reason is the already discussed 
traceability and opacity problem. The injured person should not bear the loss when 
causal failure is hardly explicable.50 Also, as “complexity of such products rises 
geometrically, the cost of litigating products liability cases would increase 
exponentially,” 51  strict liability regime would then spare enormous transaction 
costs, that is, if parties decided to litigate. The second logic suggests that, 
according to insurance-based theory, the manufacturers are in a better economic 
position to absorb the costs of loss through pricing decisions, spreading the burden 
of loss. These arguments conform to the notions of compensatory justice and 
apportionment of risk in society.52 Also, a predictable liability regime like this would 
spur innovation much better than an “uncertain fault-based liability system.”53 
 Eventually, in spite of how sophisticated and autonomous in decision making 
an AI machine is, even if it is capable of independent initiative and plans, some 
scholars suggest that it is still an instrument of other entities and has no attributed 
legal personhood.54 Therefore, the conceptual legal question that autonomously 
thinking machines pose is whether it is fair to think of them as a tool. The question 
 
46 David C. Vladeck, supra note 5: 131–41. 
47 Ibid.: 131–41. 
48 Ibid.: 146. 
49 Some legal liabilities cannot be met by insurance (Lawrence B. Solum, supra note 31: 1245). 
50 Civil Law Rules on Robotics, supra note 31. 
51 David C. Vladeck, supra note 5: 147. 
52 Ibid.: 146–48. 
53 Ibid.: 147. 
54 Civil Law Rules on Robotics, supra note 31; David C. Vladeck, supra note 5: 121. 
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of limited personhood attributed to artificial intelligence is currently broadly 
discussed in research55 at least on a theoretical level.56 The idea of an AI machines 
as an agent would perfectly match the above discussed insurance based strict 
liability regime.57  
The analysis shows that there should be a correlation between AI level of 
autonomy and applied liability regime. In case of deterministic AI devices with no or 
only basic level of autonomy, the applied liability regime is strict, based on well-
known product liability doctrine. In case of cognitive AI devices with high level of 
autonomy, the applied liability regime is strict too, but the novel regulation of 
limited personhood based on insurance should be considered. The correlation 
between AI level of autonomy and possible liability regime is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Correlation between level of AI autonomy and liability regime 
 
2.2. CASE ANALYSIS: DRONES 
The emergence and surprising popularity of drones have not only triggered 
major investment by companies but also discussions among academics and public 
authorities regarding legal implications. Drones may have negative effects on public 
safety, individual privacy, property rights which eventually may lead to socio-
economic problems. 
One of the major concerns is public safety, which is a basic human right that 
provides protection from physical, social, or emotional harm. There have been 
reports of drones colliding with other aircraft 58  and numerous reports of near 
misses.59 Some drones have crashed into people causing minor injuries.60 Lethal 
 
55 Ibid.: 129; Peter M. Asaro, supra note 39: 169; Lawrence B. Solum, supra note 31. 
56 Ibid: 1231. 
57 David C. Vladeck, supra note 5. 
58  Jonathan Vanian, “Drone Smashes Into Army Helicopter,” Fortune (December 14, 2017) // 
http://fortune.com/2017/12/14/drone-army-helicopter-smash; “Drone Collides with Commercial 
Aeroplane,” BBC News (October 16, 2017) // https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-41635518; 
“‘Drone’ Hits BA Plane near Heathrow,” BBC News (April 17, 2016) // https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
36067591. 
59 According to Australian Transport Safety bureau (ATSB) there have been 242 recorded drone related 
incidents in Australia between 2012 and 2017 most of which nearly collided with other aircraft 
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injury is obviously possible having in mind larger commercial drones; however, it 
has not yet happened in civilian contexts. 
According to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the two main risks 
threatening this basic right are air risks (collision with a manned aircraft or other 
drones) and ground risks (collision with persons or critical infrastructure). 61 
Harmful incidents can arise in a variety of different scenarios. Harm may be caused 
deliberately, for example, if the drone drops its payload to damage people or 
property or it may be sent on a “kamikaze” mission. Deliberate behaviour might be 
motivated by simply seeking thrill, revenge, aiding criminal or terrorist acts. Drones 
may also be hijacked through signal jamming, falsification of data-feed, 
interference with the control-feed, interference with software used by the drone 
pilot, or physical threat to the pilot.62 
Dangers to public safety can also derive from poor reliability of internal 
components of the drone. As drone technology becomes cheaper, more drones may 
be used by unexperienced pilots and less safety-related features may be included in 
the drone.63 Since component reliability is inseparably tied to the cost of the drone, 
one might argue that imposing major security thresholds by design might put 
unreasonably high burdens on the manufacturers and might interfere with further 
advancement of the technology. Harm may also occur because of failure of the 
user. Piloting a drone from the ground may involve long periods of boredom, 
interruptions and lapses in concentration64 which may cause the drone to accidently 
crash into obstacles. Most contemporary consumer and commercial drones have 
sense and avoid capabilities that may reduce the risk of harm; however, bearing in 
mind quite frequent drone incidents, we can assume sense and avoid technology 
needs to be further developed to be reliable. Failure of the user may be avoided 
 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, “A safety analysis of remotely piloted aircraft systems” (August 9, 
2017) // https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/2017/ar-2017-016/). 
60 Vanessa Ogle, “Drone Strike! Our Photographer Injured by TGI Friday’s Mistletoe Copter,” Brooklyn 
Daily (July 4, 2018) // https://www.brooklyndaily.com/stories/2014/50/bn-drone-disaster-at-tgifridays-
2014-12-12-bk_2014_50.html; “Athlete Injured after Drone Crash,” BBC News (April 7, 2014) // 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26921504; “Drone Crashes into Virginia Bull Run Crowd,” 
Washington Post // https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/drone-crashes-into-virginia-bull-run-
crowd/2013/08/26/424e0b9e-0e00-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html; Kate Pickles, “Toddler, 18 
Months, Left Blind in One Eye by Drone Propeller,” Mail Online (November 27, 2015) // 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-3336366/Horrific-picture-shows-toddler-left-blind-one-eye-
drone-propeller-sliced-eyeball-half.html. 
61  European Aviation Safety Agency, “Introduction of a regulatory framework for the operation of 
unmanned aircraft systems in the ‘open’ and ‘specific’ categories” (2018) // 
https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/dfu/Introduction%20of%20a%20regulatory%20framewo
rk%20for%20the%20operation%20of%20unmanned%20aircraft.pdf. 
62 Roger Clarke and Lyria Bennett Moses, “The Regulation of Civilian Drones’ Impacts on Public Safety,” 




BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 
VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2  2019 
 
 59 
entirely if fully autonomous control of the drone is developed. However, increasing 
levels of autonomy might cause other safety issues.65 
Another major concern is privacy. Most drones carry on-board video cameras 
that are able to capture images of superior quality, some are equipped with sensors 
that can help avoid obstacles, others have the ability to autonomously follow a 
person around, the higher-end drones even have advanced facial recognition 
capabilities. With such extensive technological surveillance capabilities, relative 
invisibility and silent flight of drones, it is no surprise that individuals might feel like 
they are being constantly under surveillance.66 There are different dimensions of 
privacy that might be infringed by drone use. In the light of emerging technologies 
Rachel Finn and David Wright identify seven dimensions of privacy and argue that 
drones raise issues for at least four: “privacy of behavior and action, privacy of data 
and image, privacy of location and space and privacy of association.” 67  Drone 
impacts on behavioral privacy may alter the way individuals behave in society. As 
more and more drones with surveillance capabilities are taking to the skies, 
everyone can expect to be constantly watched, regardless of whether they behave 
suspiciously or not. Overt surveillance, which is commonly exercised by CCTV 
cameras, discourages individuals from bad behavior, whereas covert surveillance, 
which may be exercised by using drones, may cause individuals to fear that they 
are under observation at any time. This, in turn, may result in a form of self-
discipline called the “chilling effect” and may cause “the stultification of freedoms of 
expression and of innovation.”68 Drones can be used collect large volumes of image 
data which, as data storage becomes cheaper, can be stored indefinitely. In the 
near future, Big Data software and artificial-intelligence technologies could be used 
to aggregate large volumes of stored data and to create behavioral patterns of 
individuals. This could enable large corporations that can afford to buy such data to 
abuse their dominant position in the market by foreseeing the behavior of 
customers and rival companies. Because most of this data will be gathered covertly, 
even more troubling is the fact that the identity of drone operators may be hard to 
 
65 A study of accident data of a military drone called “Global Hawk” found that higher levels of drone 
autonomy lead to more errors in mission planning (Kevin W. Williams, A summary of unmanned aircraft 
accident/incident data: Human factors implications, No. DOT/FAA/AM-04/24, Federal Aviation 
Administration (Oklahoma City, OK: Civil Aeromedical Inst, 2004). 
66 Rachel L. Finn and David Wright, “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Surveillance, Ethics and Privacy in 
Civil Applications,” Computer Law & Security Review Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 1, 2012) // 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2012.01.005. 
67 Seven types of privacy identified in the research are: 1) privacy of the person, 2) privacy of behavior 
and action, 3) privacy of communication, 4) privacy of data and image, 5) privacy of thought and 
feelings, 6) privacy of location and space and 7) privacy of association (Rachel L. Finn, David Wright, 
and Michael Friedewald, “Seven Types of Privacy”; in: Serge Gutwirth, et al., eds., European Data 
Protection: Coming of Age (Springer International Publishing, 2013) // https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-
007-5170-5_1). 
68 Roger Clarke, “The Regulation of Civilian Drones’ Impacts on Behavioural Privacy,” Computer Law & 
Security Review Vol. 30, No. 3 (June 1, 2014) // https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2014.03.005. 
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determine, which leads to a limited possibility for individuals to exercise data 
protection principles contained in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
such as transparency, consent and right of access.69 Privacy of location and space 
can also be infringed upon by using drones to transmit images of people’s activities 
within homes, enclosed backyards, they may be used to track the movement of 
private vehicles.70 Whereas privacy of association may be undermined by using 
drones to gather and analyze information about groups and organizations of 
individuals. Combining drone-gathered information with facial-recognition software 
would allow for the identification of people’s affiliation with certain groups or 
organizations, could be used to predict meeting locations and schedules.71 
Property is another basic human right directly infringed upon by drone use. 
Drones usually operate in the lower altitude airspace – an area just above the 
surface of the earth. This area is quite ambiguous since it is governed both by 
aviation law and property law. Aviation law regulates lower altitude airspace from 
“above”, whereas property law regulates it from “below”. Aviation law is grounded 
on the fundamental right of safety, while property law is a fundamental right by 
and of itself. The most sensitive part of lower altitude airspace, where drones use 
can be most intrusive, is in the closest reaches of the earth which are governed by 
property law. The classic scenario of intrusion is drone flights over private land and 
other real property, and a rather simple question to ask is: has the drone operator 
violated the property rights of the property owner? The answer would be: possibly, 
but proving a violation would be quite difficult since boundaries of lower airspace 
property belonging to a real estate owner are not as clearly defined as land plot 
boundaries. In other words, neither the real estate owner, nor the drone operator 
know precisely at what altitude the drone may fly to avoid intrusion. Until now 
property disputes in the low altitude airspace have been resolved on an ad hoc 
basis, which means that in every case the court would have to determine that the 
intrusion was “so immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full 
enjoyment of the property and to limit his exploitation of it.”72 This might have 
been a sound system when lower altitude airspace was practically empty, but it will 
gradually become too arduous to employ as our skies become congested with 
drones and more disputes emerge.73 Evidently, a new system to govern property 
relations in the lower altitude airspace is required. To date, there are already 
technological solutions to the property dilemma of lower altitude airspace and 
 
69 Rachel L. Finn, David Wright, and Michael Friedewald, supra note 67. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) // 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/328/256/. 
73 Troy A. Rule, “Airspace in an Age of Drones,” Boston University Law Review Vol. 95 (2015). 
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drones, one of which is the Geo-fencing technology.74 However, it will not work for 
protection of property rights until a clear regulatory framework for lower altitude 
airspace is established. 
European Commission has accurately observed in its opinion that the drone 
market can rapidly develop once an enabling policy framework is adopted.75 For 
example, as the opinion suggests: 
The number of Japanese RPAS operators was multiplied by 18 to about 14,000 
between 1993 to 2005, with a spectacular increase after the entry into force of 
regulations on agricultural use. In France an initial regulation has led to an 
increase of the number of approved operators from 86 in December 2012 to 
more than 400 in February 2014. Similar market growth and related job creation 
has been seen in Sweden and the UK. 
Sadly, lack of proper regulation (and enforcement) remains one of the two 
major limitations for the rapid adoption of drones, the second limitation being short 
battery life.76  
It would be hard to argue that state actors are lacking effort to regulate drone 
use. Discussions about drones in the European Union (EU) started as early as 2002 
and full integration of drones into civil airspace is predicted to be finished by 
2028. 77  The European Commission published a strategy in 2014 by which it 
committed to take regulatory action dealing with all relevant issues, including the 
insertion of safety, security, privacy and data protection requirements within 
existing EU rules in these areas.78 By now, the European Aviation Safety Agency 
has already published draft rules that deal primarily with the safety of drone use.79 
The United States (US) has also started drone regulation initiatives in 2012 with the 
FAA Modernization and Reform Act80 primarily focused on safe integration of drones 
in the national airspace. At the international level the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) has published two key publications: the ICAO RPAS Guidance 
Manual and ICAO Circular 328 on Unmanned Aircraft Systems which provide basic 
guidance material of basic procedures for operating remote controlled drones. ICAO 
 
74 The main idea behind Geo-fencing is to pre-program locations where drone use is prohibited into the 
software of the drone, thereby drawing virtual boundaries that the drone could not cross by default. 
75 European Commission, “Opening the aviation market to the civil use of remotely piloted aircraft 
systems in a safe and sustainable manner,” Communication, Brussels (2014) // https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52014DC0207. 
76  Bharat Rao, Ashwin Goutham Gopi, and Romana Maione, “The Societal Impact of Commercial 
Drones,” Technology in Society Vol. 45 (May 2016) // https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2016.02.009. 
77 Ben Hayes, Chris Jones, and Eric Töpfer, EURODRONES Inc. (Transnational Institute and Statewatch, 
2014) // https://www.statewatch.org/news/2014/feb/sw-tni-eurodrones-inc-feb-2014.pdf. 
78 European Commission, supra note 75. 
79 European Aviation Safety Agency, supra note 61. 
80 John L. Mica, “Text - H.R.658 - 112th Congress (2011-2012): FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012” (February 14, 2012) // https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/658/text. 
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expects that there will be “global readiness” for the widespread use of drones by 
2028.81  
While legislative solutions to drone related legal implications still seem to be 
in the discussion phase, the drone industry is encouraged to regulate itself. For 
example, since 2015 the EU has started funding the development of a web portal 
which facilitates public access to relevant regulations, requirements and 
procedures. 82  It successfully publishes up-to-date information about national 
regulatory profiles of EU member states, provides comprehensible handbooks and 
case studies that convey the most important legal implications and the best ways to 
avoid them.83 
Nevertheless, although first steps in the right direction have already been 
taken, they are very small steps considering the current growth rate of the drone 
industry. Current legislation may address the arising issues of drone use to some 
extent but it could only probably be a temporary solution.  It would be naïve to 
expect the whole drone industry to regulate itself bearing in mind the considerable 
extent of new issues drones use is creating to safety, privacy or property. It is safe 
to say that current developments in drone legislation still seems to be lagging 
behind the economic and technological developments of the industry. 
2.3. CASE ANALYSIS: BLOCKCHAINS 
Blockchain technology is not revolutionary or ground-breaking by itself and is 
more like an integral or updated part of a distributed peer-to-peer system.84 It 
serves as a tool to solve a core problem of software systems, which have struggled 
to achieve and maintain the integrity of a purely distributed peer-to-peer system 
that consists of an unknown reliability and trustworthiness. 85  This has been 
particularly hard to achieve because in order for a distributed peer-to-peer network 
to work without a centralized authority, it must have consensus upon every 
message transmitted. Before blockchain, a scattered group of random individuals 
did not have a way to confirm that a particular event had occurred if it had not 
been verified by a central authority.  
 
81 Ben Hayes, Chris Jones, and Eric Töpfer, supra note 77. 
82 COS-RPAS-2014-2-03: Facilitating Access to Regulation for Light Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
(RPAS), EASME: European Commission //https://ec.europa.eu/easme/en/cos-rpas-2014-2-03-
facilitating-access-regulation-light-remotely-piloted-aircraft-systems-rpas. 
83 “Drone Rules” // http://dronerules.eu/en/#modal-disclaimer. 
84 P2P is a network where computer systems are connected to each other via the internet and files can 
be shared directly between systems on the network without the need of a central server (Quang Hieu 
Vu, Mihai Lupu, and Beng Chin Ooi, “Architecture of Peer-to-Peer Systems”; in: Peer-to-Peer Computing 
(Springer, 2010)). 
85 Nicolas Kube, Daniel Drescher: Blockchain Basics: A Non-Technical Introduction in 25 Steps (Springer 
International Publishing, 2018), 31. 
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Technically speaking, blockchain is simply a data structure where each block 
is linked to another block. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them 
into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work,86 forming a record that cannot 
be changed without redoing the proof-of-work.87 It basically suggests that data 
stored in blockchain is immutable, because in order to access data of the oldest 
block, one must go through all of them from the newest one, until the first block is 
reached. Performing this task in order to change any data contained in the blocks 
becomes almost impossible, because all stored data is encrypted using 
cryptography techniques and each time a new node is added, it has to download 
the entire ledger and synchronize with the network. Software developers have 
already realized the potential of blockchain technology and have started to use it to 
create digital currencies, self-executing smart contracts, as well as cryptographic 
tokens that can represent property or ownership interest in emerging services. It is 
also being used to create censorship-resistant communications and file sharing 
systems, decentralized domain name management systems (DNS) and fraud-
resistant digital voting platforms. 88  Due to vast applicability, various types of 
blockchains constantly arise: payment processing and currency, supply chain 
management, asset protection, identification, personal record systems and 
passwords.89  
There are two central features of blockchain technology that make it 
exclusive: the system can be completely decentralized and the data contained in 
blocks can become immutable. These features also prove to represent the greatest 
challenge in terms of data protection under the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR). The fundamental idea of GDPR is to provide data subjects with the ability 
to control their personal data, allowing them to freely access and erase any 
unwanted records. Exercising these rights relies entirely on central authorities who 
are controllers of data. Public blockchain technology, on the other hand, may store 
data in its databases perpetually, which means that once data is stored into a 
distributed ledger system, it cannot be deleted. From a data security point of view, 
it could be seen as an advantage due to the inability to change data after it was 
stored and prevent double spending.90 Yet, a huge disadvantage could be seen 
from the privacy perspective. European data privacy laws seek to give data 
 
86 This mechanism specifies as compulsory for computers on the network to solve computationally-
intensive mathematical puzzles. 
87 Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System” // http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
88 Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi, “Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex 
Cryptographia” (2015): 8 // Available at SSRN 2580664. 
89 I.e. Shocard, Onename, Everledger. 
90 Double spending problem is a risk that digital currency can be spent twice. This is possible because a 
digital token consists of a digital file that can be duplicated or falsified (Meni Rosenfeld, “Analysis of 
Hashrate-Based Double Spending,” ArXiv Preprint ArXiv:1402.2009 (2014)). 
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS  ISSN 2029-0454 
VOLUME 12, NUMBER 2  2019 
 
 64 
subjects better control over their personal data, whereas public blockchain 
technology, restricting future access to the data stored in a ledger, achieves the 
complete opposite of the European vision. Moreover, public blockchains have no 
central authority that can be held accountable for inadequate use or storage of 
personal data, which also contradicts data privacy laws of the European Union. 
Analysing GDPR articles regarding data controllers, 91  every node could be 
considered a data controller as they can freely join a public blockchain and seek 
objectives of their own. However, nodes themselves only have an uninvolved 
scenario: they cannot change anything in a block, neither can they see clear 
information of other nodes.92 On the other hand, only public blockchain technology 
contradicts the principles of data protection of the EU, whereas private blockchains 
are still based on the idea of central oversight and can have central operators that 
would be held accountable under the GDPR. 
In light of the innovative technology of public blockchain, it seems that GDPR 
may have become outdated the second it came into force. GDPR is built around 
data controllers and their ability to oversee and manage how personal data is 
processed, while public blockchain takes a completely opposite approach to that of 
the GDPR – it relies upon a decentralized governance model, which prevents any 
interference through central controllers. With vast amounts of various personal 
information stored publicly and indefinitely, problematic situations are sure to arise. 
For example, it is likely that an individual at some point in time may want to 
withdraw his consent or to delete his personal information stored on a public 
blockchain.93 Also, there may be situations where the purpose of processing data 
ceases to exit (if processing cannot be based on another legal ground).94  The 
economic cost of erasing must be considered too, since changing or deleting data in 
a chain requires significant resources. Consequently, blockchain technology may 
have become a victim of its own innovation regarding GDPR. 
Currently, neither the European Union nor the United States has legislation or 
clear guidelines towards data protection regarding blockchain. Lack of legislation 
creates not only legal uncertainties, but also a privacy risk regarding personal data. 
The present situation is similar to the emergence of the internet – it took 
 
91 Regulation 679/16 defines controller as the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other 
body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member 
State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or 
Member State law.  
92 Michèle Finck, “Blockchains and Data Protection in the European Union,” Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. Vol. 4 
(2018): 30. 
93 Satoshi Nakamoto, supra note 87: 26. 
94 Paul Voigt and Axel Von dem Bussche, The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): Practical 
Guide, 1st ed. (Springer International Publishing, 2017), 157. 
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approximately two decades for people and regulators to understand that putting a 
vast amount of personal data (in most cases, without any particular reason) for 
everybody to see, without a mechanism to properly control/regulate, can induce 
serious negative effects on our daily lives, as Cambridge Analytica has shown. Even 
though the United States recognizes a signature secured through blockchain 
technology as an electronic signature and even the validity of blockchain records 
and their admissibility in courts as evidence without the need for authentication, 
questions about data privacy remain open across the world. Such questions are: 
can people who use public blockchain (for example, Bitcoin) exercise rights granted 
by GDPR? If so, who should be held liable for breaches of these rights (or who is 
the data controller of such platform)? Moreover, if they fail to comply with GDPR, 
fines for data controllers are calculated on the basis of the total worldwide annual 
turnover of the preceding financial year, but given the model public blockchains are 
based on, with thousands of individual nodes, it seems that the current calculation 
method would not work. In spite of all these already prominent issues, the 
European Data Protection Board, which is an independent European body that 
contributes to the consistent application of data protection rules throughout the 
European Union and promotes cooperation between the data protection authorities 
of the union, remains silent. 
Another noteworthy implication that emerges through blockchain is the 
existence of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs). A DAO is an 
organization that functions through rules encoded as computer programs called 
“smart contracts.”95 Instead of a traditional organization structure managed by a 
set of humans interacting in person and controlling property via the legal system, in 
DAOs management and control are automated according to protocols specified in 
code and enforced on the blockchain. In other words, DAOs are based on self-
governing software that lives on the internet and exists autonomously (humans are 
not involved) with the benefits, but without the inflexibility of formal corporate 
structures (instead of concentrating decision-making at the executive level, 
shareholders of DAOs can participate in decision-making by decentralized voting). 
By removing centralized management, DAOs could eliminate the errors and 
corruption introduced by humans and bring new forms of democratic collective 
action, transforming top-down governance approaches that are criticized for their 
inflexibility, opacity, slowness and democratic deficit. 96  A well-known example, 
 
95 Usman W. Chohan, “The Decentralized Autonomous Organization and Governance Issues” (2017): 1 
// Available at SSRN 3082055. 
96 Philip Boucher, et al., supra note 25, 21–22. 
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intended for venture capital funding, was THE DAO, which launched with $150 
million in crowdfunding in June 2016, and was immediately hacked and drained.97 
Just as regular legal entities, DAOs could engage in commerce, therefore not 
only legal problems with damages and/or losses can occur (who should be 
responsible if the organization is operated autonomously), but also traditional 
notions of legal personality could be challenged. As opposed to traditional 
corporations or organizations, DAOs are neither owned, nor controlled by any single 
corporate or governmental agency, nor any individual person. Yet they can interact 
with the public in a way that might give rise to specific rights and obligations. 
Decentralized organizations can thus have a significant effect on third parties, and 
might even be at the source of certain torts or wrongdoings.98 There are opinions 
that the aforementioned problems could be mitigated by adopting the nearest 
person principle with the given example of autonomous vehicle (manufacturer of an 
autonomous vehicle would be held liable should any sort of damages occur)99 but 
only if creators of DAOs are known. However, if DAOs are created by other DAOs or 
anonymous persons, this principle would not suffice. Either way, creating 
functionally working DAOs is no easy task. Directly embedding legal rules into 
codes of DAOs should be well thought through before launching such organisations 
to avoid legal uncertainty, possible disputes, or ineffective management. Traditional 
“dumb” contracts may still need to be signed in order for the involved parties to 
recognize from the beginning how a particular DAO will operate. Therefore, close 
cooperation between business people, lawyers, and programmers will be inevitable. 
IN LIEU OF CONCLUSIONS: MAPPING PRIVATE LAW CHALLENGES 
Analysis of cases shows that transformative innovations create a non-
exhaustive list of interdependent challenges which are summarized in Figure 2. 
From the case analysis we can distinguish at least three fields of law that will suffer 
the strongest impact: privacy, liability and property. 
Although the mapped challenges are based on the case analysis of only three 
innovations examined in this article, most of them would be applicable to other 
technologies as well. It is likely that the vast majority of emerging innovations will 
have at least some properties inherent to artificial intelligence, drones, or 
 
97 Samuel Falkon, “The Story of the DAO — Its History and Consequences,” Medium (August 12, 2018) 
// https://medium.com/swlh/the-story-of-the-dao-its-history-and-consequences-71e6a8a551ee. 
98 Satoshi Nakamoto, supra note 87: 26. 
99  Steve Tendon and Max Ganado, “Legal Personality for Blockchains, DAOs and Smart Contracts,” 
GANADO Advocates (June 4, 2018): 4 // https://ganadoadvocates.com/resources/publications/legal-
personality-for-blockchains-daos-and-smart-contracts/. 
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blockchains; therefore, their analysis seemingly addresses a lot of the legal 
implications that other technologies might entail.100 
For example, artificial intelligence might drastically improve every smart 
device that we use in our day to day lives, enabling robotic vacuum cleaners, 
personal assistants, smart thermostats, driverless cars, personal drones and many 
others to learn and function on their own; it might be used to process, classify and 
interpret huge amounts of information; and when combined with medical software 
and equipment it might monitor, diagnose and even cure patients. Drones can be 
paired with a variety of onboard components such as data receivers/transmitters, 
video cameras, thermal sensors, facial recognition software, and they can be tools 
for collecting large amounts of information as well as function in groups or swarms 
that learn and think collectively. The decentralized, immutable and secure nature of 
blockchain technology enables it to converge with other technologies because it has 
the potential of making every centralized process fully autonomous – it can be used 
to protect self-driving cars or to secure the internet of the future. 
 
100 Some implications mentioned in the case analysis have not been mapped in Figure No. 2 because 
they were only relevant to the particular technology in discussion, for example, safety of drone 
operations or enforceability of blockchain-based smart contracts. 
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Figure 2: A non-exhaustive list of private law challenges generated by transformative 
innovations.101 
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101  Cybersecurity threats include hacking, identity theft, surveillance, cybercrimes, spam, behaviour 
targeting, internet jurisdiction and the like. Some of the cyber trust enhancing measures are privacy and 
data protection, cryptography, identity management, encryption and the like. More about challenges of 
cybersecurity and trust in section 2.2 (example of drones) of this article. 
102 According to World Economic Forum, in a few years, more than a trillion sensors will be connected to 
the internet, including most home appliances or cars. Big data is “huge amounts of data gathered from 
different sources, aggregated and analysed through algorithms”. It could be used especially involving AI 
technologies for automated assessments and decision-making processes. Together with the potential for 
Big Data (personal and environmental) of becoming essential for data-driven innovations, it also poses 
risks especially in terms of unlawful discrimination and bias (Ana Gomes, “REPORT on Fundamental 
Rights Implications of Big Data: Privacy, Data Protection, Non-Discrimination, Security and Law-
Enforcement,” European Parliament // http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2017-
0044_EN.html). 
103 The idea behind Open Data conception is that some data should be freely available to everyone to 
use for global public good, without restrictions from copyright, patents and other licensing. It is related 
to the participatory model phenomenon, discussed in section 2.3 of this article (example of blockchains) 
and includes such open access measures like internet affordability, net neutrality, cloud computing and 
the like. 
104 For example, public blockchains have the feature of immutability: once data is stored into distributed 
ledger system, it cannot be deleted. See section 2.3 (example of blockchains) of this article. 
105  Covert surveillance, which may be exercised by using transformative innovations, may cause 
individuals to fear that they are under observation at any time, resulting in a form of self-discipline 
called the “chilling effect” and accordingly stultification of freedoms of expression. See section 2.2 
(example of drones) of this article. 
106 The decisions of epistemically opaque machines are not only unpredictable, but also hard to trace, 
because they can learn from past human experiences and calibrate their algorithms themselves. See 
section 2.1 (example of artificial intelligence) of this article. 
107 With the increasing autonomy of smart devices, the question is who will bear legal responsibility for 
their behaviour. Currently, there typically seems to be a ‘shared’ or ‘distributed’ responsibility between 
designers, engineers, programmers, manufacturers, investors, sellers and users, because none of these 
agents can be indicated as the ultimate source of action, but this solution tends to dilute the notion of 
responsibility altogether. See section 2.1 (example of artificial intelligence) of this article. 
108 In many aspects autonomous vehicles are expected to be better at performing precarious activities 
that are currently performed by man (for example, driving), because machines never fall asleep, they 
never drive drunk, get distracted by a text message or conversation, they never drink coffee or eat, they 
do not get angry or drowsy. It poses the question of standard of care in liability regulation. See section 
2.1 (example of artificial intelligence) of this article. 
109 See section 2.1 (example of artificial intelligence) of this article. 
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As transformative technologies become more and more embedded in our 
daily routine, we begin to notice that they are not just neutral objects or tools, but 
mediators, 113  which indeed shape, interpret, transform, and make meaning of 
human lives.114 The potential of transformative innovations, however, comes along 
with a set of tensions and risks, which can ultimately work against the wellbeing of 
humankind. 
 The case analysis has shown some of the reasons behind these emerging 
legal implications. Anticipating that every smart device will eventually be able to 
exhibit at least some degree of autonomy because of advancements in artificial 
intelligence technology, one of the most evident reasons is the growing level of 
“consciousness” and autonomy of emerging technologies. Some of the identified 
challenges that reflect this reason could be epistemic opacity in AI decision making, 
the vague legal status of electronic personhood, the ability to aggregate significant 
amounts of data in ways that reveals private behaviour of individuals, and property 
legislation that is no longer up to date to regulate the use of digital assets. 
Another reason could be the growing availability of transformative 
innovations to the broad public and the development of participatory models in 
economy and other social spheres, including law. Social networks (Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram), sharing economy (Uber, Airbnb, Task Rabbit) and 
cryptocurrencies (Bitcoin, Ethereum) are just a few examples of this phenomenon. 
In terms of the analysed technologies, the mapped challenges that reflect this 
tendency are airspace ownership and regulation of air traffic in lower airspace 
congested with unlicensed users, the immutability of data in public blockchain fair 
distribution of value in co-created ownership (sharing economy), and distributing 
machine responsibility among stakeholders.  
A further reason is the tendency for transformative innovations to function in 
regulatory uncertainty. In the system of legal rules, there is a very common 
 
110 As a matter of fact, property legislation is outdated for regulating digital assets, because property 
laws were mostly created for tangible assets, so such causes ownership, inheritance, transfer of digital 
assets, as well as of cryptocurrencies, consumer protection, e-commerce to be regulated inadequately. 
111 Massive drone use has caused a previously empty area of airspace (in the closest reaches of the 
earth) to congest with thousands of small devices piloted by inexperienced individuals. See section 2.2 
(example of drones) of this article. 
112 Shared assets are referred to as a part of a so-called shared or collaborative economy, which refers 
to business models where activities are facilitated by collaborative platforms that create an open 
marketplace for the temporary usage of goods or services often provided by private individuals, enabling 
people to offer services, promote new employment opportunities, flexible working arrangements and 
new sources of income, encouraging more asset-sharing and more efficient use of resources (European 
Commission, “A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy,” Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the 
Committee of the regions (June 2, 2016) // https://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/com2016-356-
final.pdf). 
113 Mireille Hildebrandt, supra note 7, 174. 
114 Katinka Waelbers and Tsjalling Swierstra, “The Family of the Future: How Technologies Can Lead to 
Moral Change”; in:  Jeroen van den Hoven, et al., eds., Responsible Innovation 1 (Springer 
International Publishing, 2014) // https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-8956-1_12. 
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division of legal categories into certain binary systems, for example: public vs. 
private, business vs. personal, labour vs. professional, manufacturer vs. consumer, 
commercial property vs. personal property, and so on. However, in the context of 
transformative innovations these regulatory schemes often do not correspond to 
reality, as quasi-professional, quasi-commercial, quasi-public legal relationships 
emerge, whose regulation is in the so-called “grey zone.”115 Some argue that most 
current legal instruments are too slow and ineffective for regulating transformative 
innovations. According to prof. Milleire Hildebrant modern law grew up in a culture 
of print and remains firmly wedded to the medium of text. So, legal concepts and 
instruments which were developed in print culture may be ineffective in internet 
age.116 Therefore, we argue that traditional hierarchical regulatory models ought to 
be replaced by decentralized, soft, inclusive governance tools as well as foresight 
instruments. 
There could be at least two approaches for how to cope with challenges 
generated by technological progress. The first is to wait while technology is still 
developing and try to understand issues stemming from the process. According to 
this approach, lawmakers should delay regulation in order to stimulate the 
emergence of new transformative technologies and focus on products (outcomes) 
as a core value rather than the process of innovation. This is a dominating 
regulatory response to innovation in the United States. The other approach is more 
precautionary, focusing on possibilities to understand the true ends of emerging 
technologies, to prepare for complex, but fundamental societal impacts, 
appreciating and shaping the moral role of technologies toward a human-centred 
framework. This kind of approach is prevailing in the European Union.117 
 Choosing the right approach can be quite challenging. If we focus on the 
process rather than the outcomes, it is difficult to ascertain the full impact of 
transformative innovations while they are still emerging, whereas if we focus on the 
outcomes, technologies will probably have matured so much that they will already 
be embedded in social and economic layers of society, and the impacts may be 
difficult to change (Collingridge dilemma).118 
 
A Call for Value-Based Legal Regulation 
In a future where all devices will be interconnected, intelligent, able to learn 
from past experiences, where every technology will be able to monitor, interpret 
 
115 Vanessa Katz, “Regulating the Sharing Economy,” Berkeley Tech. Law Journal Vol. 30 (2015): 1092. 
116 Mireille Hildebrandt, supra note 7, 140–218. 
117 World Economic Forum, supra note 4: 5; European Parliament calls for “a gradualist, pragmatic and 
cautious approach” with regard to future initiatives on robotics and AI (Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 
supra note 31). 
118 Ibid: 5. 
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and predict human behaviour, the values that we embed in their design during the 
early stages of their development become crucial to ensure a good life for human 
beings. Waiting until technology is fully developed and only then trying to 
understand their social, economic, and political impact would be too difficult, if not 
impossible. 
Value-based legal regulation should comport the principles and values 
enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, i.e. the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy 
and justice, human safety, health and security; freedom, privacy, integrity and 
dignity; self-determination and non-discrimination, equality, justice and equity, 
informed consent, private and family life, personal data protection,119 as well as on 
other underlying principles and values of the Union law, such as “non-
stigmatization, transparency, autonomy, individual responsibility and social 
responsibility”120. 
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